Executive Summary
Chinese Crop Protection (CP) innovators are entering a different phase of globalization. While China-origin science is increasingly credible, a harder question is how to turn a promising asset - molecule, formulation or technology - into durable global value.
China biopharma offers a useful reference point. The companies that moved furthest did more than sign larger deals at the best price possible. They learned to decide which assets deserved global investment, which markets to retain, where a partner could add real value and which capabilities had to be built in house. The partnerships that scaled were supported by the personal conviction of founders or CEOs, trust built through repeated work (from initial small concrete steps), with evidence designed for the target market and deal structures that protected both sides when priorities changed.
For Chinese CP leaders, the practical choice is selective. Build when ownership creates a lasting advantage across products or markets. Partner where another company can move faster, share risk or bring capabilities that are difficult to recreate. A proprietary innovator, an emerging R&D company and a manufacturing or registration led globalizer will make different choices.
The three cases in this paper illustrate why and how. CSPC x AstraZeneca grew from small steps into a broader platform relationship. Innovent and Lilly show why global development requirements have to be built in from the start. BeOne and Novartis show how quickly asset value can change, and why reversion rights and internal capabilities matter when a deal no longer fits.
Why this benchmark matters
The economics and regulatory systems are different, but the management question is close: which assets deserve global capital, which markets should be owned, and where can a partner create more value than the company can create alone?
China CP is moving beyond manufacturing and generics toward proprietary Active Ingredients, differentiated formulations and new technology platforms. At the same time, domestic pricing remains compressed, global registrations require significant capital, and MNCs need to rejuvenate their off-patent product portfolio through partnerships. Biopharma is relevant because it shows how companies-built trust, designed rights, managed setbacks and chose between partnership and direct ownership.
“Science – not just in proximity innovation – is increasingly credible. The harder gaps are market strategy, registrability, capital allocation, talent and partnership management.”
Senior MNC Crop Protection Business Development Executive, interview with Beyond Consulting
Three partnerships, three different outcomes
The cases are different, but each highlights a decision that Chinese crop protection leaders will also face.
CSPC × AstraZeneca: trust before scale
Between October 2024 and July 2026, CSPC and AstraZeneca announced four agreements spanning a cardiovascular asset, AI enabled small molecule discovery, eight obesity and diabetes programs, and an siRNA platform. Their maximum disclosed potential value totals about $27.6 billion, excluding royalties, with most of the value still contingent on future development and sales milestones.[1]
The progression matters more than the headline number. The relationship moved from individual assetstoward repeatable access to CSPC platforms. AstraZeneca’s separate commitment to invest $15 billion in China through 2030 also placed the partnership within a broader corporate view of China as a source of global innovation.[2]
“The first steps were small and pragmatic. Trust grew through execution, and both the deal size and the speed of collaboration increased. Our CEO’s conviction and full support proven decisive.”
Senior AstraZeneca Executive, interview with Beyond Consulting
As the relationship deepened, the structure also became more sophisticated: rights were tailored by asset and geography, while later agreements increasingly gave AstraZeneca access to CSPC’s underlying discovery and delivery platforms. The value moved from individual molecules toward repeatable innovation capability.
For CP leaders, the practical implication is to start small. Begin with a contained piece of work that matters to both sides, such as a joint trial or a focused development program. Once the relationship has delivered, larger decisions become easier. Platform relationships are earned through repeated execution rather than declared at the outset.
Innovent × Eli Lilly: build global development in from the start
In 2020, Lilly paid $200 million upfront and offered up to $825 million in milestones for rights to sintilimab outside China. In February 2022, the FDA advisory committee voted 14 to 1 that additional trials demonstrating applicability to United States patients and medical practice should be required. Innovent regained the rights outside China later that year.[3]
The broader relationship continued. In 2026, the companies announced their seventh collaboration. Innovent would lead programs through Phase 2 proof of concept in China, while Lilly would receive rights outside Greater China. The agreement included $350 million upfront and up to about $8.5 billion in potential milestones.[4]
For CP innovators, global development should be designed for the intended market from the outset. The closest analogy is data portability: OECD MAD, GLP and country specific requirements shape the cost, timing and probability of registration. The relationship also proved resilient because the failure was contained to one asset and geography. Years of collaboration across other programs remained valuable, while Innovent continued to diversify its partner base and strengthen its own global development capability. A single setback therefore did not determine the company’s broader international pathway.
BeOne × Novartis: keep strategic options open
In 2021,Novartis paid $650 million upfront for tislelizumab, with up to $1.55 billion in potential milestones. A second agreement gave Novartis an option on ociperlimab for $300 million upfront and up to $700 million on exercise. Both agreements were terminated in 2023. Novartis said that the PD 1 landscape had changed considerably, while the public record gives no definitive reason for the ociperlimab termination.[5]
“PD 1 had strong strategic value in 2021. Two years later,the market was crowded and every major pharma company had one.”
Senior BeOne Executive, interview with Beyond Consulting
BeOne later discontinued ociperlimab after a futility analysis, while tislelizumab received its first United States approval in March 2024. Because BeOne had already built global development, manufacturing and commercial capabilities, the return of rights created a usable option rather than an operational gap.[6]
The BeOne case points to a different priority: preserve options. A terminated deal may reflect arket crowding, asset risk or changing portfolio priorities. Staged options, clean reversion rights and selective internal capabilities allow the company to keep moving when the original structure no longer fits.
What supports long term partnerships
Taken together, Beyond Consulting’s research found three conditions that consistently supported
partnerships that deepened or recovered.
Senior conviction creates room to move. When the opportunity is ahead of organizational consensus, a visible sponsor gives the team both speed and legitimacy. This was clear in the AstraZeneca case and came through again in our crop protection interviews.
Trust lowers the cost of the next decision. Small collaborations establish working norms, improve the quality ofinformation exchanged and reduce diligence friction. The value of the relationship therefore grows with each successful cycle.
Deal economics are viewed over the full lifecycle. Across the pharma cases, value was created and shared by milestones achievement and royalties rather than upfront cash. For Chinese CP innovators, the implication is to compare consider the expected lifecycle value, capability gained and strategic options created, rather than the headline valuation of an asset alone.
The asset plan and the deal structure need to evolve together. Differentiation and timing shape bargaining power.Global evidence, IP, data ownership, investment stages and reversion rights should develop with the asset, so that both sides can absorb a scientific, regulatory or market setback without losing the wider relationship. When exit mechanics are agreed upfront, a termination remains a portfolio decision, not a partnership dispute.
These conditions also explain why a good partnership can still end. Asset value, competitive intensity and corporate priorities move over time. The objective is to preserve value and strategic options when they do.
Where the analogy needs caution
The three cases point to useful principles, but the mechanics do not transfer directly. Three differences matter for CP leaders.
Registration and data portability. Crop Protection registration is fragmented across jurisdictions. s of August 2026, China is not listed among the full adherents to the OECD MAD system, adding a
specific cost and data portability hurdle.[7]
Economics. Oncology can supportexceptional milestone ceilings and royalty rates. Even differentiated CP Active Ingredients operate within a smaller value pool.
Company starting points and geopolitical exposure. Proprietary originators, registration led exporters and manufacturing led companies face different choices. Agricultural inputs also intersect directly with food security and supply chain resilience, which makes transparent governance and market by market scenario planning important from the outset.
What this means for Chinese Crop Protection innovators
The CP market is already showing patent-cliff pressure. Industry analysis identified 19 active ingredients expected to lose patent protection between 2023 to 2028. Global players are already partnering with Chinese originators; the UPL and CAC Nantong agreement for cyproflanilide is just one public example of joint global development, registration and commercialization.[8]
The starting point of innovators matters in defining the best pathway to globalization. We see three broad situations in the market, each with a different logic for partnership and capability building.
These are starting positions, not permanent labels. A company can move from one position to another as its pipeline, balance sheet, registrations, talent and overseas experience mature.
These starting positions also connect with the broader globalization pathways we explored in our recent article, “What Chinese Crop Protection Leaders Can Learn and Unlearn about Japan”: the practical challenge is to sequence capability building, partnership and selective market ownership around each company’s starting point and ambition.
The practical choice: what to build, where to partner
The decision should be made asset by asset and market by market. In practice, the leadership discussion comes down to five questions:
- Is the asset genuinely differentiated, and is that differentiation likely to last?
- Is the market strategically important enough to justify direct ownership?
- Can the company fund the registration pathway and wait for the return?
- Does the company have, or can it attract, the regulatory, commercial and alliance talent required?
- Can a partner create materially more lifecycle value, faster or with lower risk?
Build where ownership compounds advantage across assets or markets. Partner where another party brings scarce capability, reduces risk or accelerates time to value. Territory, stage or capability splits often provide a better answer than either full control or a broad licence.
MNCs have work to do as well
Senior pharma and CP practitioners repeatedly raised four requirements on the MNC side: one accountable interface for the Chinese partner, faster and clearer decision
rights, visible senior sponsorship, and global teams that understand China.
In practice, opportunities often stall around familiar internal questions: whether an external molecule is strategically preferred to an internal asset, who owns the IP, who funds the global data package, and which business ultimately carries the investment decision.
Conclusion: a practical agenda for Chinese Crop Protection leaders
The five priorities below capture the most transferable lessons from the biopharma
experience.
- Act early and make partnership a deliberate strategic choice. Partnering capability will become a competitive advantage as Chinese innovators expand overseas and MNC portfolios face continued generic pressure.
- Match the model and timing to the innovator and the asset. Start with pragmatic collaboration, build trust and scale when the evidence supports it. Retain control where ownership creates advantage; partner earlier where capabilities or capital are missing.
- Stage capital and preserve options. Use phased commitments, clear data ownership, decision rights and reversion terms as efficacy, safety, resistance and registration evidence develops.
- Treat registration capital and geopolitical exposure as portfolio choices. Global evidence packages require substantial time and capital. These decisions belong in portfolio strategy, alongside market attractiveness and risk.
- Invest in governance, talent and trust on both sides. Chinese innovators needstronger global strategy and alliance capabilities. MNCs need faster decisions, empowered Business Development teams and senior sponsors who understand China.
The larger point is straightforward: global presence is built through the quality of the assets, choices and capabilities accumulated along the way, rather than the number of products or markets entered.
How Beyond Consulting can help
Beyond Consulting helps Chinese Crop Protection innovators turn promising innovation into global value, and helps MNCs identify, assess and access the China origin innovations that matter.
We combine China market understanding, global strategy and partnership experience to move both sides from opportunity to executable collaboration.
About the authors
Chris Wu is Co Founder and Director of Beyond Consulting, with more than 20 years of experience in consulting, business leadership, innovation and transformation across Asia Pacific, with a focus on agribusiness.
Alexandre Bulcourt is Co Founder and Director of Beyond Consulting, with morethan 20 years of experience in strategy consulting, entrepreneurship and digital innovation across Asia Pacific and Europe, with a focus on agribusiness growth, strategy and transformation.
Footnotes
[1] AstraZeneca, “AstraZeneca strengthens its cardiovascular pipeline with agreement for a pre clinical novel lipid lowering therapy,” 7 October 2024; AstraZeneca, “AstraZeneca enters strategic collaboration with CSPC Pharmaceuticals focused on AI enabled research,” 13 June 2025; CSPC Pharmaceutical Group, HKEX voluntary announcements, 30 January 2026 and 2 July 2026.
[2] AstraZeneca,“AstraZeneca plans to invest $15 billion in China through 2030,” 29 January 2026.
{3] Innovent Biologics,Collaborations and Partnership chronology; US FDA, Final Summary Minutes of theOncologic Drugs Advisory Committee Meeting, 10 February 2022; Innovent Biologics, 2022 Annual Report, published 28 April 2023.
{4] Innovent Biologics,“Innovent Announces Strategic Collaboration with Lilly,” 8 February 2026.
{5} BeiGene, now BeOne, press release, 11 January 2021; Novartis, “Novartis strengthens immunotherapy pipeline with option, collaboration and license agreement,” 20 December 2021; BeiGene Form 8 K filed with the US SEC, 10 July 2023; Novartis statement, 19 September 2023.
{6} BeiGene, now BeOne, pressrelease, 3 April 2025; US FDA approval package for TEVIMBRA, BLA 761232, 13 March 2024; BeOne Medicines, 2024 Annual Report and corporate launch announcement, 27 May 2025.
[7] OECD, “The MutualAcceptance of Data System,” accessed 25 August 2026.
{8] AgriBusiness Global,citing S&P Global, 16 August 2023. Timing varies by jurisdiction and patent family; UPL Corp and CAC Nantong, press release on the strategic agreement for cyproflanilide, 12 November 2024.